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One of the most dominant threats against web applications is the class of
script injection attacks, also called cross-site scripting. This class of attacks
affects the client-side of a web application, and is a critical vulnerability
that is difficult to both detect and remediate for websites, often leading
to insufficient server-side protection, which is why the end-users need an
extra layer of protection at the client-side, utilizing the defense in depth
strategy. In this thesis, a client-side filter for Mozilla Firefox is presented
and implemented, with the goal of protecting against Reflected cross-site
scripting attacks, while maintaining high performance. By conducting tests
on the implemented solution, the conclusion is that the filter does provide
more protection than the original Firefox version, at the same time achieving
high performance, which with only some further improvements would become
an effective option for end-users of web applications to protect themselves
against Reflected cross-site scripting attacks.
ii
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Associate Professor P̊al Ellingsen,
for his invaluable comments and guidance he has given me during the writ-




List of Figures ix
List of Tables ix
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3.1 Regular Expressions Considered Harmful in Client-Side
XSS Filters [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.2 Precise Client-side Protection against DOM-based Cross-
Site Scripting [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks and Defense Mech-
anisms: Classification and State-of-the-Art [3] . . . . . 3
1.3.4 Related Work Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Theoretical Background 5
2.1 Web Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Information Security Principals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2 Web Security Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.3 Injection Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Stored/Persistent XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2 Reflected/Non-Persistent XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.3 Document Object Model (DOM) Based XSS . . . . . . 10
2.2.4 Other XSS Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Universal XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Self XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.5 Cross-Site Scripting Exploits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Injection input sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Example attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.6 Counter-Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
iv
Validation/Sanitization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Output encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Content Security Policy (CSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Same-origin policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
HTTPOnly cookie flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Disabling JavaScript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Cross-Site Scripting Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Server-side filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Client-side filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.1 Regular Expression Based Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 XSS Auditor - A string-matching Based Filter . . . . . 20
2.3.3 State of Current Browsers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 Mozilla Firefox 24
3.1 Firefox Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1.1 Loading of a Web Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Security Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.1 Same-Origin Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2.2 Compartments and Principals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2.3 Content Security Policy (CSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 Design and Implementation 30
4.1 Design Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.1 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Low false-positives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
High performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Provide protection against Reflected XSS . . . . . . . . 31
4.1.2 Browser Extension vs Internal Implementation . . . . . 32
Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.1.3 Blocking Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1.4 Filtering Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 Design Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
v
4.2.1 Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.2 Filter Class Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.1 Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Development Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Mach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
GNU Project Debugger (GDB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.1 Data Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.2 Examining Input Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4.3 Looking for Injections - Matching Algorithm . . . . . . 38
Basic evasion techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Different encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Different attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4.4 Handling of Discovered Script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4.5 Firefox Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.4.6 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.4.7 Unit Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5 Analysis and Assessment 43
5.1 Protection Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1.1 Methodology of Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Blocked scripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Injected scripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Limitations regarding filtering rules . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Limitations regarding request input sources . . . . . . 48
5.2 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.2.1 Methodology of Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.3 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.3.1 Conform to Mozilla Firefox’s Internal Coding Standards 52
5.3.2 Blocking Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Partial blocking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
vi
Blocking whole page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3.3 Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Choosing blocking technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Violation feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
6 Conclusion 55




ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange. 39
CSP Content Security Policy. v, 16, 26, 27, 29, 34, 40, 54, 55
CSS Cascading Style Sheets. 24, 32
DOM Document Object Model. iv, 3, 8, 10, 24
GDB GNU Project Debugger. vi, 36
HTML HyperText Markup Language. 11, 24, 26, 27
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol. 8, 13, 48, 53, 57
IDE Integrated Development Environment. 36
OWASP Open Web Application Security Project. 1, 14
SQL Structured Query Language. 7
SQLi Structured Query Language injection. 6, 7
URL Uniform Resource Locator. 8, 9, 11, 13–15, 21, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 54,
55
VS Code Visual Studio Code. 36
W3C World Wide Web Consortium. 17
XML Extensible Markup Language. 24
XSS Cross-Site Scripting. iv, 1, 3, 4, 6–8, 11–15, 17–23, 27, 31, 33, 37, 43,
48, 49, 54–56
XUL XML User Interface Language. 24
viii
List of Figures
1 Web application vulnerability disclosures in 2016. Figure taken
from ”IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2017” [4] . . . . 6
2 Stored/Persistent XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Reflected/Non-Persistent XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4 DOM Based XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 XSS Auditor design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6 Simplified data flow for rendering a web page . . . . . . . . . 25
7 An overview of the relationships between the different security
principals. Figure taken from Mozilla’s website, about ”Script
Security”[5] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8 XSS Filter placement inside Firefox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9 Testing of the implemented filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
List of Tables
1 Top 5 Web Browsers XSS Protection Status. Data retrieved
from Mozilla [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2 Testing of the implemented filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47





Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) has for long been among the top threats against
Internet security as defined in numerous reports containing detailed infor-
mation about the prevalence and danger regarding this class of vulnerabil-
ity. One of these reports is the ”Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) Top 10 - 2017” report, which contains a list of the 10 most crit-
ical web application security risks [7]. Even though cross-site scripting has
fallen to a 7th place in the ”OWASP Top 10 - 2017” report [7], cross-site
scripting still remains one of the most serious attack forms. Another report,
being published annually for the past 12 years, by WhiteHat Security, called
“2017 - WhiteHat Security Application Security Statistics Report” [8], also
identifies that cross-site scripting is among the top two most critical web
vulnerabilities. An interesting and troubling observation made in this re-
port is that even though cross-site scripting is considered one of the most
critical vulnerabilities, it is not being prioritized for remediation by most
websites. The statistics being presented suggest that the vulnerabilities re-
ceiving most attention are vulnerabilities that are easy to fix, which is not
the case for cross-site scripting. As a result of this, it is suggested that orga-
nizations must adopt a risk-based remediation process, which means that the
most critical vulnerabilities should be prioritized first, like cross-site script-
ing. A report [9] published by Bugcrowd Inc., a web-based platform that
use crowd-sourced security for companies to identify vulnerabilities in their
web applications, has analyzed the data from their platform, including in-
formation about the most common vulnerabilities found. The data in their
report is based on all BugCrowd’s collected data from January 2013 through
March 2017, which contains of over 96 000 submissions, where the by far
most reported vulnerability is cross-site scripting with a submission rate of
25%. They also have data on the most critical vulnerabilities sorted by type,
where cross-site scripting is considered the second most critical, which cor-
respond to the same result found in WhiteHat Security’s report. These are
some of the most recent numbers regarding cross-site scripting statistics, but
there have been published numerous studies on XSS vulnerabilities, attacks
and its prevalence. One study from Hydara et al. [10] from 2014 conducted a
1
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systematic literature review were they reviewed a total of 115 studies related
to cross-site scripting. They concluded that XSS still remains a big problem
for web applications, despite all the proposed research and solutions being
provided so far. As seen from the more recent numbers from OWASP, White-
Hat and BugCrowd, this conclusion still holds true, that XSS vulnerabilities
remains to be at large.
1.2 Problem Description
Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities are caused by insufficient validation/sanitation
of user submitted data that is used and returned by the website in the re-
sponse, which could compromise the user of the site. An attacker could
potentially use this vulnerability to steal users’ sensitive information, hijack
user sessions or rewrite whole website contents displaying fake login forms.
With the observation about how prevalent this type of attack is, and accord-
ing to the mentioned WhiteSecurity report that it is being not prioritized nor
easy for websites to fix and remediate, it becomes clear that the user needs
some means of protecting themselves at the client-side, since it is mainly
the end-users of vulnerable web applications that are affected by potential
attacks. Amongst the top 5 most used web browsers [11], Mozilla Firefox is
the only browser which does not include any kind of built-in filtering against
cross-site scripting attacks, which may compromise users in the case of a
vulnerable web application.
1.3 Related Work
This thesis is based upon existing research regarding the state of current
client-side filtering for cross-site scripting attacks, containing weaknesses and
suggestions for further improvements. Based on these existing results, a
filtering solution for Firefox was first proposed in a paper by the author of
this thesis, ”Client-Side XSS Filtering in Firefox” [12]. This thesis builds on
the same work and expands on the results given there.
2
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1.3.1 Regular Expressions Considered Harmful in Client-Side XSS
Filters [1]
This paper analyses existing client-side filters and techniques for cross-site
scripting, before presenting a better solution based on a different design.
The filters analyzed uses regular expressions for their filtering, which the
paper concludes being either unacceptably slow or easily circumvented. They
then present a new filter design which achieve high performance and high
precision, by implementing the filter to blocking scripts after the HTML
parser but before script execution, and by using string matching instead
of regular expressions. Their filter, XSS Auditor, was first implemented in
the WebKit rendering engine, and is now enabled by default in the Google
Chrome browser.
1.3.2 Precise Client-side Protection against DOM-based Cross-
Site Scripting [2]
This paper also discusses flaws with existing client-side filters, including the
already introduced XSS Auditor. The paper focuses most on flaws related
to DOM Based XSS vulnerabilities, which is a subtype of XSS, which is
not the primary focus of XSS Auditor, but yet relevant as XSS Auditor is
being considered as state-of-the-art in client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
mitigation. After elaborating several limitations in existing filters, the paper
presents an alternative filter design mainly focusing on DOM Based XSS,
by looking at attacker-controlled syntactic content, utilizing runtime taint
tracking and taint-aware parsers to stop attacks.
1.3.3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks and Defense Mechanisms:
Classification and State-of-the-Art [3]
This paper contains statistics and analysis of the current situation concern-
ing vulnerable websites with the main focus on cross-site scripting attacks.
The paper contains a thorough discussing regarding cross-site scripting the-
ory, from basic concepts, discussion of different types and their outcome,
to describing how to both perform an attack and to identify if a website is
vulnerable to XSS attacks. Then the paper analyses several existing filters
for protecting against XSS attacks, filters both placed on the client-side and
3
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server-side of web applications, finding different limitations contained in all
of them. The paper ends with proposing several additions and guidelines for
creating better XSS defensive techniques and filters.
1.3.4 Related Work Conclusion
All the presented papers chosen for related work contains analyses for differ-
ent existing solutions for filters protecting against cross-site scripting attacks.
All of them go into specific details regarding the flaws of different filters,
which are then used to create some requirements that needs to be addressed
when creating a new filter. Although the three chosen papers does analyze
some of the same filters, they all provide some unique evaluation of the find-
ings. The three papers also focuses on different areas concerning cross-site
scripting filters, either a specific type of XSS attack or a more general anal-
ysis regarding XSS filters and their current state. Reading and collecting all
the proposals from the different papers, comparing them and putting them
together, creates a solid understanding of the different limitations and dif-
ferences between the current state-of-the-art filters. This is knowledge that
is important when proposing a new solution based on many of these ideas
presented.
1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 will go into detail about web security and more specifically about
XSS, explaining everything from what it is to different ways of protecting
against it, focusing mainly at the client-side of web applications. This sec-
tion will also include information about the current state regarding XSS
prevalence and existing work, before ending with a detailed description of
the methodology used in this thesis work. Following, in Chapter 3, will be
describing the web browser, Mozilla Firefox, which is the application that
this thesis work are building upon. Chapter 4 will then describe all the de-
sign choices and the actual implementation of the work done, before Chapter
5 will contain an analysis of how well the work is done, in terms of protec-
tion effectiveness, performance and integration into Firefox. The chapters,
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, contains a conclusion based on all the work done,





Web applications need to be protected against malicious users who want to
steal and tamper their data. Web security is a broad concept, including many
different aspects, protection mechanisms and potential outcomes. To be able
to protect a web application, basic understanding of information security is
therefore needed, as it regards some basic principles and objectives for why
security is important and how to utilize it correctly.
2.1.1 Information Security Principals
Information security defines three important objectives of security [13], which
are maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality is
about protection of information and data from being accessed by unautho-
rized parties. When someone gets access to data that they should not have
access to, like sensitive information about users, it is considered a breach
of confidentiality. Integrity is about the authenticity of information, ensur-
ing that it is not altered and to make sure the source of the information is
genuine. In web applications, this could be if an attacker is redirecting you
to a different site than you originally intended to visit, as the site you get
redirected to is not genuine. And lastly, availability regards that information
should be accessible for the authorized users, which of course should be done
in such a way that there is no breach in confidentiality or that someone might
alter the available data when accessing it. All these objectives of security are
important when creating secure web applications. To be able to fulfill them
all, web applications need to protect against several different attacks from
malicious parties trying to steal their and their users data. This is not an
easy task, as there exists so many different types of attacks for targeting all
kinds of vulnerabilities that are often contained in web applications.
2.1.2 Web Security Statistics
Several companies and organizations are doing annual research and assess-
ment work containing a lot of collected data from a huge number of web ap-
plications and reports regarding security breaches and vulnerabilities. One
5
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Figure 1: Web application vulnerability disclosures in 2016.
Figure taken from ”IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2017” [4]
of these reports [8], already mentioned in the introduction, from WhiteHat
Security, goes into depth describing the current web security state. This
report does not only contain information about XSS attacks, but a whole
range of other web vulnerabilities with information of how prevalent they
are, as well as which industries and areas that are the most vulnerable to
different attacks. WhiteHat’s report also contains a list of a vast number
of web application vulnerability classes, describing 64 different web vulner-
abilities that needs to be protected against for web applications. This is
a huge number of vulnerabilities, and while not all are relevant for every
web application, many of them are critical, which needs to be addressed ac-
cordingly, where the injection attacks XSS and Structured Query Language
injection (SQLi) is considered the most critical. Another report, by IBM,
”IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2017” [4], is another comprehensive
report containing statistics from different security events including web secu-
rity, identifying what vulnerabilities are used and targeted industries. IBM
also concludes that XSS and SQLi vulnerabilities are the most critical and
prevalent, as seen in Figure 1, which need more attention by the different
industries. As a whole, containing all web vulnerabilities, both reports have
6
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identified a small decrease in vulnerabilities in web applications, but also that
attackers are targeting the most critical vulnerabilities more, in which one of
the most critical, XSS vulnerability, is the least prioritized by applications
to fix. Another concerning factor identified by both reports is that it takes
too long to fix web vulnerabilities, which means both the application itself
as well as the end-users are at a higher risk of being affected by a security
breach.
2.1.3 Injection Attacks
The reports from WhiteHat Security and IBM, as discussed above, makes it
clear that the most prevalent attack on web applications is injection attacks,
which includes attackers trying to break the confidentiality by stealing data
from the web application itself or from the users of the web application.
Injection attacks are performed with attackers inputting untrusted input to
web applications that is executed as a command or query in such a way that
it alters the course of execution, which could result in stealing of sensitive
information or altering of data. There exists several types of injection attacks,
but the most prevalent is by far SQLi and XSS. SQLi involves unauthorized
users to inject Structured Query Language (SQL) commands that can read
or modify data from a database connected to the web application. This is
achieved through the usage of user-supplied input that gets used as part of
a SQL query without the web application validating or encoding the input
correctly. As attackers can read and modify data upon a successfully executed
SQLi attack, it is possible to steal sensitive user data such as usernames
and passwords, alter the contents of the stored information or simply delete
everything contained in a database, which would incur huge complications
for the affected web applications. The other critical vulnerability, XSS, will
be covered in more depth in the following section.
2.2 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities are caused by insufficient validation/sanitation
of user submitted data in form of JavaScript code, that is used and returned
by the website in the response without making sure the content is safe to
use, which could compromise the users of the site. An attacker could poten-
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tially use this vulnerability to rewrite the contents on the website creating
fake login forms to steal users’ sensitive information, hijack user sessions or
redirect them to other malicious websites.
There are three main types of cross-site scripting attacks, but there also
exists some other defined types:
• Stored XSS, also called Persistent XSS
• Reflected XSS, also called Non-Persistent XSS
• DOM Based XSS
• Others - Plug-in XSS, Universal XSS, Self XSS
2.2.1 Stored/Persistent XSS
Stored XSS occurs when the injected script is stored on a publicly accessible
area of a website, which means on the actual website itself. Typical places
susceptible to Stored XSS attacks are in comment sections, message board
posts or in chat rooms. Since the input data is stored in these places, if
the input data is an injected script, the injected script might get executed
upon loading of the page, if the page is vulnerable. When a user visits one
of these places, the browser will retrieve the data and render it, which in
turn will execute the Stored XSS attack in the browser’s context. Figure 2
illustrates the flow of a typical Stored XSS attack. Other places susceptible
to Stored XSS attacks might include areas of a website only accessible to
administrators, like a visitor log or other logs containing information about
the usage of the website from users, as it is possible to inject JavaScript code
into Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) headers [14] like the Referer [15]
or User-Agent [16] headers. As the data from these headers are not unlikely
to show up in some kinds of logs, a successful XSS attack here would be
performed in the context of an administrator’s browser, where it might be
possible to not only get access to sensitive information from a single victim,
but rather data from the whole web application. This type of XSS is very
difficult to protect against on the client-side, as the client has no means to
identify whether the JavaScript code coming from a website is legitimate,
or if it is malicious JavaScript code injected by an attacker. A user does
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Figure 2: Stored/Persistent XSS
anything in the request to a website for a Stored XSS attack to be executed.
From the client’s perspective, all JavaScript code coming from a website is
legitimate and should be rendered accordingly.
2.2.2 Reflected/Non-Persistent XSS
Reflected XSS occurs when the user input data is sent in a request to a
website, which immediately returns data in the response to the browser,
without the website first making sure the data is safe. Reflected XSS attacks
are performed by entering data into search fields, creating an error message or
by other means where the response use data from the request. In a Reflected
XSS attack, the JavaScript attack code is not stored on the website itself, like
it is in a Stored XSS attack. For a Reflected XSS attack to work, the attacker
needs to somehow make the victim request a special query, containing the
malicious script. As mentioned, the search field is a typical input field that
can be attacked. When searching for a query, the website often returns
a page containing some results, which also will generate an unique URL
containing the submitted query. This is how an attacker would create a
specially crafted URL containing the exploit code, which then needs to be
9
Theoretical Background 10
Figure 3: Reflected/Non-Persistent XSS
shared with a victim. If a user visits this particular URL, the attack code
will run and execute in the user’s browser. Figure 3 illustrates the flow of a
typical Reflected XSS attack. As seen from this figure, a Reflected XSS attack
contains a request to and response from a website, where the code inserted
in the request is being used in the response. It is this particular data flow
that protection mechanisms can take advantage of, where it is possible to
compare the contents of the request with the contents of the response, to
identify a potential attack. In this thesis, this technique is utilized, which
means it focuses on primarily stopping Reflected XSS attacks.
2.2.3 DOM Based XSS
DOM Based XSS is a type of XSS attack that in contrast to the other two
types of XSS attacks only rely on JavaScript vulnerabilities on the client-side
of the website, and not the server-side. DOM Based XSS attacks exploits how
a website uses JavaScript to dynamically change the DOM of a web page.
The DOM of a web page is the structure of the page, containing information
for the browser on how to render the page, with the usage of different HTML
tags and attributes. The DOM of a page makes it possible for JavaScript
10
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Figure 4: DOM Based XSS
code to interact with the page, making the page more dynamic. This also
makes it possible for malicious code to change the page, if JavaScript input
is not handled correctly. If a website includes some JavaScript code in the
response that directly uses input from an input source, like the URL, a DOM
Based XSS might be executed. Figure 4 illustrates the data flow of a typical
DOM Based XSS attack. These attacks can actually be performed without
even sending the attack script to the web server at all, by using a special
HyperText Markup Language (HTML) character, the fragment identifier #,
in the URL. When using the fragment identifier, everything behind it will
not be part of the request. This means that from the user inputs some data,
to the malicious code is executed in the browser, the malicious code is neither
part of the request nor the response of the website, but rather part of the
DOM of the web page, if the content after the fragment identifier is used by
client-side code in the response. DOM Based XSS is the least common type
of XSS attacks, but it is also the most difficult to find and protect against.
Since the attack only relies on flaws on the client side, by using JavaScript
code, server-side filtering can not detect this attack at all, which is a good




2.2.4 Other XSS Types
Although there exits three main types of cross-site scripting, as these attacks
have evolved and been used in different ways, XSS types could now be cate-
gorized into some additional sub-categories, Universal XSS, Plug-in XSS and
Self XSS.
Universal XSS Universal XSS [17] is a form of XSS attack that exploits
the browser itself, browser extensions or website extensions in order to ex-
ploit a website. Universal XSS is a very dangerous type of XSS as it does
not exploit the website directly, meaning that a website does not need to
contain any vulnerabilities to be exploited. Modern web browsers support
extending their functionality by utilizing plug-ins, small programs that adds
more features to the browsers. There also exists plug-ins that are not loaded
through the browser, but by the website itself. These plug-ins often have ac-
cess to the contents of the websites, and often require input from the user for
its functionality to work. By having user input in combination with features
for displaying or editing contents on a web-page, the plug-in might create an
opening for allowing a cross-site scripting attack against the web-page it is
being used on. An example could be a plug-in that allows websites to display
pdf-files. If an attacker injects some JavaScript code in the filename of the
displayed pdf-file, this JavaScript code could be rendered in the browser, if
the plug-in does not have proper validation and encoding for the input field
used for the filename. XSS vulnerabilities introduced by insecure plug-ins are
often categorized as Plug-in XSS, which could be considered as a sub-type
of Universal XSS.
Self XSS Self XSS is when users themselves create and execute the attack
in their own browsers, which can not exploit other users, as in the case with
the three main types of XSS. Self XSS is mostly a social-engineering attack
used to trick users into executing XSS attacks on themselves, often by making
them copy and paste JavaScript code into their own browsers. Awareness
around this particular attack was gained through the popular social media
website Facebook.com, as this attack became quite widespread against the
users of their site, which led to Facebook publishing a warning [18] against
Self XSS scams. Facebook even created a warning displaying when a user
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opens the developer console window in their browser while visiting their site
facebook.com, to mitigate the attack.
2.2.5 Cross-Site Scripting Exploits
As described in Chapter 2.2, XSS attacks occur because web applications are
using unsanitized input data when displaying and rendering content. For a
successful XSS injection, from the attacker’s perspective, the input containing
the malicious JavaScript content needs be entered into the web application
in a way that its somehow gets executed in the browser. The next sections
will explain how this is done, and give some examples of how typical XSS
attacks are performed.
Injection input sources When performing an XSS attack, it is possible to
inject the malicious script into the web application by using several different
input sources. An input source is considered an entry point for user input to
enter into the application. The most common input sources for XSS attacks
are from the GET- and POST- parameters, which most often comes from
HTML input elements. A typical example is the search field found on many
websites, which most often is a HTML input tag. After using the search
field, the search query is likely to be included in the URL of the returned
web page, which would consist of a GET parameter containing the query.
HTTP headers is another input source for script injections, as discussed in
Chapter 2.2.1. Injecting script content through HTTP cookies, which is a
small piece of data sent to the user’s web browser from a server, is also an
option, although this is much less common, as a potential attacker would most
likely need to get access to other users’ cookies for injecting their script. Since
the end goal of a XSS attack often includes getting access to such cookies,
using them as an input source for an attack seems less likely, although in
theory it is still a possibility.
Attack vectors For a successful XSS attack, the injected script content
needs to be entered into the web application in a way that would actually
render the script in the browser. This could be done by using a wide variety
of attack vectors, depending on how the web application uses the input when
generating the response. Attack vectors are typically a combination of HTML
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tags that include the script to be injected and executed. These tags could
either embed the script content directly or reference an external resource
containing the JavaScript code. The most common attack vector is the usage
of the script tag. Another very common attack vector is the usage of the img
tag in combination with on-event handlers [19]. The on-event handlers are
properties that lets HTML elements react to events, where events are different
actions like when an element is being clicked, getting focus, or when it is
loaded. The reaction to an event can be specified to load script content, which
is why they are often used in XSS attacks. OWASP’s ”XSS Filter Evasion
Cheat Sheet” [20] is a comprehensive list of attack vectors utilizing a lot of
different techniques, including many uses of on-event handlers. Other than
the most common script and img tag, the iframe-, body-, svg-, object-
and style- tag are also HTML tags not uncommonly used in XSS attacks.
OWASP’s list [20] contains descriptions of these and many more, including
techniques to hide the injected script from being detected by potential XSS
filters.
Example attack A typical scenario for a XSS attack starts with an at-
tacker looking for input fields on a web page where the submitted data is out-
put without being encoded. As mentioned above, the search field is a common
input source. An attacker could therefore exploit a vulnerable search field,
with the intention of trying to hijack another user’s session. The search field
is often exposed for an attack, as when you input a query, the same query is
most likely being returned and rendered by the website. If this input is not
properly being encoded, it could allow the attacker to input JavaScript code
that is being executed in the browser’s context when the website returns the
query, which could be achieved using the script tag as the attack vector. For
hijacking a user’s session, the attacker would need some JavaScript code that
extracts the user’s session data, typically found in a cookie from the logged
in targeted user. The exploit code, <script>document.location=’http://
attacker/cookieStealer.js?c=document.cookie</script>, could then be
inserted into the search field. After creating this exploit, the attacker would
need to copy the URL from the result page after doing the search. Since this
is a Reflected XSS attack, the attacker would then need to share this URL to
potential users of this exploited site. If a targeted logged in user now visits
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this particular URL, the user’s session cookie is being sent to the attacker.
The attacker could then use this cookie to log in onto the exploited website,
which means the attacker would be impersonating the user.
Another popular XSS attack is to rewrite the contents of a website, creating
fake forms for tricking user’s to enter sensitive data like credit-card informa-
tion or login details. The attacker would then make these forms submit the
sensitive data to themselves, rather than to the exploited website.
A typical thing that XSS attacks have in common is that they are often not
easy to detect by the end-users themselves. In case of both the cookie steal-
ing and fake forms exploits, the attacker could simulate the actual behavior
of the exploited website, making it almost impossible for users to detect that
they have been compromised. By having a client-side filter in the browser,
user could not only be notified of a potential attack, but the filter could also
completely stop it from occurring in the first place, which is the intent of the
filter.
2.2.6 Counter-Measures
There exists many counter-measures for XSS attacks, consisting of several
techniques as well as more specific policies to follow, for securing web ap-
plications. It is highly recommended to utilize a variety of many different
counter-measures, as it might be challenging to implement them being com-
pletely robust and secure from unknown attacks and not all policies is fully
supported by all web browsers.
Validation/Sanitization The first step towards protecting against XSS
attacks is to make sure that valid malicious code does not enter the web
application at all. Validation/Sanitization of all untrusted data input to
a web application makes sure that malicious input is either being rejected
or manipulated into being safe for usage in the response from the website,
used in the output in users browsers. It might be difficult to implement
this properly as it can be challenging to know what a malicious input looks
like, considering all the possible attack vectors that use advanced obscuration
techniques. A common mistake is to rely only on blacklist validation, which
is often trivial for attackers to circumvent, by utilizing alternative input
variations. White-listing is in general considered much safer, only allowing
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the characters that the web application should accept, for example an integer
or a date. In case of free-form text input, white-listing becomes difficult, as
the users should be allowed to enter almost any character, hence the free-
form. Any validation technique becomes ineffective and difficult to implement
in the case of free-from text, which is why input validation should not be used
as the primary defense against cross-site scripting attacks, and why output
encoding is needed.
Output encoding Output encoding is the most effective remediation for
cross-site scripting attacks when done properly. Output encoding should be
implemented every place untrusted input is being output and rendered in the
browser, making sure the input is displayed as data and not executed as code
in the browser. It is important to implement the output encoding according
to the context it is being used in, because different encodings are needed
depending on the context used. JavaScript, HTML and URL’s all use various
encodings, which is why there are no single solution to how output encoding
should be implemented. Typical strategies are to escape unicode, a typical
character encoding, converting unwanted characters to benign equivalents,
percent encoding and escaping hex values, as described in more detail in
OWASP’s XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet [21].
Content Security Policy (CSP) Another powerful counter-measure is
Content Security Policy (CSP), which is a declarative policy that let web
application owners create rules for what sources the client is expecting the
application to load resources from. To enable CSP, the web server needs
to utilize the Content-Security-Policy HTTP response header [6], where
the policy for the application is specified, including desired directives. Each
directive describes a policy for a certain resource type or policy area, for
example to prevent inline scripts from running, only allowing content to be
loaded for some trusted domains or restricting all content to only load from
the site’s own origin. CSP also have a reporting feature, which means when a
policy is being violated, it is possible to get a report sent to a desired location,
containing information about the violation. This could be helpful for web
application owners to know if their policies are too strict or needs modifica-
tions, as a policy can consist of many different directives. Even though CSP
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can stop most cross-site scripting attacks by utilizing a set of well-defined
directives, it is stated in the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Recom-
mendation [22] that CSP is not meant as a first line of defense mechanism,
but rather an element in a defense in depth strategy, as an added layer of
security. A study by Weichselbaum et al. [23] was done in 2016, including
1,680,867 hosts with 26,011 unique CSP policies, observing that 94.68% of
all policies that attempts to limit script execution are ineffective, as well as
99.34% of the hosts have policies that offer no benefit against XSS at all.
This is a very clear indication that CSP in practice is difficult to utilize cor-
rectly and this is why it should not be used as the primary defense against
cross-site scripting attacks.
Same-origin policy Same-origin policy [24] is a policy implemented inside
web browsers that isolates potentially malicious documents by restricting how
a document or script loaded from a specific origin can interact with resources
from other origins. For two web pages to have the same origin, they need to
have the same protocol, port and host, which means they are allowed to load
resources from each other. Cross-site scripting attacks often involve the usage
of different external JavaScript files for collecting data from compromised
users, which could be blocked by utilizing the same-origin policy.
HTTPOnly cookie flag As mentioned in Chapter 2.2.5, cookies could
contain valuable information for attackers, which means they should be
protected from unauthorized access. The HTTPOnly cookie flag is an addi-
tional flag included in the Set-Cookie HTTP response header [25], preventing
JavaScript code from accessing the contents of cookies. This is not considered
a counter-measure for XSS, but rather for mitigating the risk of an attacker
accessing other users cookies in the case of an attack.
Disabling JavaScript A more drastic approach that would effectively stop
XSS is to disable JavaScript, since these attacks rely on a JavaScript environ-
ment for execution. This solution can be effective for simple static websites,
but most dynamic websites require some sort of JavaScript support for basic




2.3 Cross-Site Scripting Filters
Filters try to stop cross-site scripting attacks by utilizing a set of rules to
detect potential malicious input data, before either blocking it or sanitizing
it for safe usage. There exists many XSS filter implementations, with varying
focus on the different areas such as security, performance, low false-positives
and usability. All of these areas are in focus in most filters, but it is not
common for a filter to be best in all categories, as they do not necessarily
compensate each other. There is, however, one clear way to differentiate
between filters, by dividing them into two groups, server-side and client-side
filters:
Server-side filters Server-side filters are implemented on the server side
of a website, which means it can only detect input data that are sent via the
server. The DOM Based XSS attack is possible to perform without sending
the attack code to the server at all, as discussed in Chapter 2.2.3. This
means a server-side filter would not be able to detect the attack at all, which
implies it would not be able to stop the attack. There are several existing
server-side filters, which typically needs to be integrated into the source code
of the web application. A study made by S. Gupta and B.B. Gupta [3]
has a quantitative discussion for server-side filters, discussing some of the
state-of-the art techniques they are using. The study concludes that there
are generally several flaws with server-side filters that needs to be addressed,
like too much altering of existing code-base, long learning phase, as well
as too many false-positives and false-negatives. The study also emphasizes
that server-side filters do not detect DOM-based XSS attacks. With all
the combined flaws and design limitations of server-side filters, it becomes
evident that only relying on server-side protection is not enough, and why it
is necessary with client-side filters as an extra layer of security.
Client-side filters Client-side filters are located in the client, which typi-
cally would be the web browser used to access web applications. Client-side
filtering could be able to detect DOM Based XSS attacks, providing the extra
protection server-side filters are missing. However, even though client-side
filters could possibly detect all types of XSS attacks, it should not be used
alone, without server-side filters. By placing the filter on the client-side, it
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means that the user might be able to modify it to circumvent the filtering.
It is, therefore, strongly recommended to utilize both server- and client-side
filtering, to be able to protect against all attack types of XSS and achieving
good protection following the defense in depth strategy. This thesis focuses
on client-side filtering, which includes a discussion of varies existing solutions,
presented in the next sections.
2.3.1 Regular Expression Based Filters
Using regular expressions is a popular technique for client-side filters, where
the filter is typically located between the network layer and HTML parser
in the browser. Regular expressions are then used to identify potential mali-
cious code in the HTTP requests and to approximate the rules of the HTML
parser to know which content in the HTTP response that would be treated
as script content [1]. By doing these approximations, the filter do not have to
recreate the browser’s own HTML parser, which would lead to the HTTP re-
sponse being parsed twice, first for the filter to identify and remove potential
malicious code and then for the browser to parse the page as normal. These
approximations does, however, have their drawbacks, as they incur a higher
number of false-positives, due to several flaws in their design [1]. These flaws
is a consequence of attackers trying to make the content from the request, the
actual attack code, differ from the response, so that the approximation rules
would not detect it as an attack. Some common flaws are that the filters do
not correctly approximate the decoding process of different encodings or do
not take into consideration that different characters can be used to delimit
HTML attributes.
A popular client-side XSS filter using regular expressions is an extension
called NoScript [26], for the Mozilla Firefox browser, first released in 2005
and actively updated by the maker Giorgio Maone. The filter is matching
HTML code for injected JavaScript in the request by utilizing regular ex-
pression rules for simulating the HTML parser, which would potentially lead
to false-positives, as it is better to over-approximate these rules than to let
an attack bypass the filter [1]. Due to a lot of false-positives, NoScript try to
solve this by prompting the user to repeat the request with the filter disabled,
allowing the user to decide for themselves if they think it were a false-positive.
This is a decent approach for security-aware users, but in general, users do
19
Theoretical Background 20
not have the knowledge or desire to take action in the case of security-related
issues [2].
2.3.2 XSS Auditor - A string-matching Based Filter
String matching is another method for client-side XSS filtering, used by the
filter in the Google Chrome browser, called XSS Auditor. XSS Auditor works
by matching the HTML code for injected JavaScript code from the request
with the response from the website after it is been parsed by the browser’s
own HTML parser [1]. This means that XSS Auditor does not need to
approximate any of the HTML parser rules, since the parsing is already done
when the matching algorithm starts. This is achieved by the location of
XSS Auditor, which is between the HTML parser and the JavaScript engine,
as shown in Figure 5. This placement makes it possible to block scripts
after parsing, by blocking them from being sent to the JavaScript engine for
execution. The location of XSS Auditor have benefits like performance, by
not having to simulate the HTML parser, and the fact that the JavaScript
engine have a narrow interface it is reasonable to assure that all scripts are











Figure 5: XSS Auditor design
XSS Auditor also have some limitations, some of which are discussed in
the paper from Stock et al. [2], which lists several flaws with the design and
string-matching algorithm used in XSS Auditor. As mentioned in the paper,
these are mainly flaws regarding protection of DOM-based XSS, which is not
the main type of attack that XSS Auditor is protecting against. It is, how-
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ever, relevant to take notice of these limitations, as it might be desirable to
not make the same limitations when designing and implementing a new filter.
Scope issues are related to the fact that XSS Auditor does not support every
type of XSS or are neglecting functionality that enables XSS attacks. One ex-
ample being that XSS Auditor relies encountering dangerous elements during
the HTML parsing of the response, which is not always the case, for example,
when a web page is using the JavaScript function eval() [27]. eval() is a
function that evaluates the string representation of JavaScript code inserted
inside its parentheses, which means if eval() uses data from the URL of the
loaded web page, this evaluation could be done without entering the HTML
parser, which means that XSS Auditor would not detect it.
Another flaw in XSS Auditor is that some special characters needs to be
present in the request for the filter to be activated. If any of these characters
are not present, the filter deactivates. As the paper describes, it is possible
to successfully execute a XSS attack without any of these special characters
being used at all.
Double injections is another limitation that XSS Auditor does not protect
against, which is the inability to detect attacks containing concatenated val-
ues coming from more than one source of user input. An attacker could use
two different input sources due to application specific code that concatenates
two or more user inputs. When creating an attack using double injections, the
exploit code consist of two or more parts, but gets executed as one concate-
nated attack code. Since XSS Auditor’s string-matching algorithm checks
for the whole script code, the algorithm would not detect the attack, as the
whole script code does not exist from any single user input source.
2.3.3 State of Current Browsers
Regular expressions and string matching are among the techniques being
implemented in the top five most used web browsers for desktop, which ac-
cording to the desktop browser market share worldwide from StatCounter
[28] are Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer/Edge and Safari. Table 1 con-
tains information on the state of their XSS protection status. Both Chrome
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and Safari use the mentioned string matching based XSS Auditor filter. XSS
Auditor was first build into the browser engine WebKit, which Safari uses,
before also being integrated into a fork of WebKit called Blink, which Chrome
uses. Internet Explorer and Edge both have a filter implemented based on
the regular expression technique, first introduced in Internet Explorer 8 [29].
Firefox, however, being the second most used web browser, does not have a
built-in filter, but rather relies solely on CSP support, which again relies on
websites to properly define the CSP rules. By not having a client-side filter,
the defense in depth strategy is also weakened, where a potential filter would






Table 1: Top 5 Web Browsers XSS Protection Status.
Data retrieved from Mozilla [6]
2.4 Methodology
The work done in this thesis is to create a built-in filter protecting against
Reflected XSS vulnerabilities inside the Mozilla Firefox browser. The choice
of protecting against XSS for Mozilla Firefox is made for several reasons, one
being that XSS vulnerabilities are of the most critical and prevalent web vul-
nerabilities in existence today with lacking protection mechanisms on both
the server- and client-side of web applications [10] [8] [7]. This, in combina-
tion with the fact that Mozilla Firefox, which is the second most used web
browser [28], does not provide a built in filter for XSS protection, in contrast
with the other major web browsers, Chrome, Edge, Safari and Internet Ex-
plorer, which do have such a filter built-in. The work of this thesis will, there-
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fore, be to create this filter built into and integrated with the existing source
code of Mozilla Firefox, which is possible due to the fact that Mozilla Firefox
is fully open source, allowing full access to the source code of the browser.
This would be a case-study/pilot-case for the effect of building, integrating
and running a filter protecting against XSS inside of Mozilla Firefox. As
this is the second most used browser, with a market share of approximately
11.7%, as of the statistics from StatCounter’s desktop browser market share
worldwide for April 2018 [28], and the fact that XSS vulnerabilities are as
prevalent as they are, it would be beneficial to look at a possible solution
for adding this extra layer, the added filter, to the defense in depth strategy
combining several XSS protection mechanisms for optimal overall protection.
For the work to be considered a possible usable solution, it needs to be eval-
uated throughly. There exists several different web browsers, all competing
to being the best one, in terms of different factors such as performance, secu-
rity, usability, customization and general look and feel. In such a competitive
industry, web browser need to make sure that every included functionality
is integrated and running as smoothly and efficient as possible, meaning an
additional feature need to be well defined and robustly integrated. In the
case of creating a filter for XSS, it needs to be secure, providing the neces-
sary protection, and at the same time be efficiently integrated so the overall
performance of the browser is not affected in any huge negatively direction.
This means that the work done needs to be evaluated in terms of at least
two different categories, how well it protects against XSS attacks and how
much it affects the performance compared to Firefox without the filter imple-
mented. The overall validation of the filter would be a qualitative research,
as of how well the filter is implemented into the existing solution, but at the
same time contain a quantitative method for measuring the performance of
the filter, which could be accurately measured and compared to the original
browser. By analyzing the performance number, however, it is not possible
to correctly classify it as either right or wrong, but rather an estimation and
analysis about if the added feature are in fact within reasonable limits to be




Mozilla Firefox is a free and open-source web browser developed by Mozilla,
with it’s first major release in 2002 [30]. Firefox’s source code has a layered
architecture where the code is organized as separate modular components.
Firefox is multi-threaded and follows the rules of object oriented program-
ming, where access to internal data is achieved through public interfaces of
the classes [31]. One of the primary requirements of Firefox is that it must
be completely cross-platform, which is why the browser consists of several
components focusing on this area, like making sure the operation system de-
pendent logic is hidden from the application logic.
This chapter will explain some of the most relevant parts of Firefox, with
regards to the filter created in this thesis work. The parts explained have
been slightly simplified, making it easier to understand the relation of how
everything is working together, again with regards to the added XSS filter.
3.1 Firefox Overview
The main components of Firefox can be divided into the user interface XML
User Interface Language (XUL) and the browser and the rendering engine
Gecko. XUL is Mozilla’s own language for building portable user interfaces,
which is an Extensible Markup Language (XML) language [32]. Gecko is
Mozilla’s browser engine built to support many different Internet standards,
including HTML 5, Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) 3, DOM, XML, JavaScript
and others. Gecko contains many different components for document pars-
ing (HTML and XML), layout engine, style system (CSS), JavaScript engine
called SpiderMonkey, image library, networking, security, as well as other
components [33].
Mozilla also have a build system [34] using the make tool [35], consuming
Makefiles. The command-line interface Mach [36] is used to help developers
perform common tasks for working with the Mozilla codebase, making it easy
to start building, debugging and testing Mozilla projects.
Firefox consists of over 36 million lines of code [37], written in several lan-
guages, which are mostly C++ and JavaScript, but also HTML, C, Rust,
XML, Python and Java, as well as other less used. The source code direc-
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tory of Firefox [38] contains of many folders where the code is grouped based
on their functionality. Some of these groups consist of functionality related
to document parsing, JavaScript execution, image loading, extensions and
networking, just to mention a few. Mozilla also have strict rules about how
the code should be implemented, not just how it is structured into directo-
ries. As mentioned above, Firefox is object-oriented, using a lot of public
interfaces. They have also implemented several utility- and helper-classes
for writing specific functionality inside their code-base. Although the source
code is mostly written in the C++ language, which provides this function-
ality built-in, Mozilla uses many of their own methods for these functions.
This means that it is necessary to acquire specific knowledge regarding these
coding rules before attempting to make changes to the Mozilla codebase, as
it is a complex piece of software.








Figure 6: Simplified data flow for rendering a web page
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3.1.1 Loading of a Web Page
As mentioned above, Firefox consists of several components, include its ren-
dering engine Gecko, which is the most relevant part for the implementation
of this filter, as it contains everything related to document parsing and han-
dling of JavaScript execution. Figure 6 is a simplified description of the
loading of a document in Firefox, containing only the relevant parts which
are important regarding the XSS filter. When a typical HTML web page
is loaded through Firefox, two internal document classes, nsDocument and
nsHTMLDocument, are created, controlling the creation and representation of
the web page to be loaded. These documents are responsible for creating and
calling all the relevant parsers, like the HTML parser [39], nsHtml5Parser,
as well as initializing the script executioner class, ScriptLoader, which
is responsible for handling script content coming from script tags. The
HTML parser receives data from the network that needs to be parsed. Every
time the parser encounters some script content, the relevant parts of Firefox
that handle this content is invoked. In the case of on-event handlers, the
EventListenerManager class is invoked. A common source for script con-
tent is the script tag, where the script loader class, ScriptLoader, would
be invoked with the discovered script. The script loader class will then try to
extract the script and either execute it as an inline or external script. Before
the script is passed to the JavaScript engine for execution, a security check is
performed for finding out if the script is allowed to run. This security check
involves checking with the CSP rules if it is allowed to load, if these rules
are specified by the loaded website. If the script pass this check, it will be
handed over to the JavaScript engine which will execute the script in the
browser. The HTML parser will continue parsing the data entering through
the network, repeating the steps when new script content is discovered.
3.2 Security Mechanisms
Firefox includes many internal security mechanisms for making sure that
the browser itself is not being compromised by attackers, as Gecko loads
JavaScript content from untrusted and potentially malicious web pages, which
then again run on the user’s computer. These security mechanisms include
several complicated concepts regarding same-origin policy, compartments,
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and principals, all explained in detail at Mozilla’s own website [5]. This sec-
tion will try to give a simplified explanation of why all these concepts are
important and how they are used. The reason why this is interesting to
look at is because a counter measure for XSS, CSP, is implemented inside
Firefox using the principal concept. Since CSP provide similar functionality
as the work done in this thesis are providing, the filter created should also
ideally be implemented in a way that follows the same principles, fulfilling
the necessary security requirements.
3.2.1 Same-Origin Policy
The same-origin policy is restricting how a document or script loaded from
a specific origin can interact with resources from other origins, as described
in Chapter 2.2.6. The security model for web content is based on this policy,
which is also used inside Firefox as a script security mechanism [5]. As
Firefox’s rendering engine Gecko consist of different languages, its core in
C++ and its front-end in JavaScript, these to parts needs to interact with
each other in a secure manner. The JavaScript front-end is actually running
with system privileges, meaning that if it is compromised, attackers might
get control of the user’s computer. As this JavaScript code is interacting
with web content from web applications, which again is susceptible to XSS
attacks, it is important to make sure that JavaScript code from Gecko itself
is not affected by any such attack, which is achieved by utilizing the principle
of the same-origin policy.
3.2.2 Compartments and Principals
A security measure in Gecko is that it is divided into different compartments.
Compartments could either be internal parts in Gecko or a content window,
a typical website, where different parts can only access other parts if they
are in the same compartment. The concept of compartments is, therefore,
using the same-origin policy principle. Every part inside a compartment
is, therefore, same-origin with the others and no additional security checks
are performed when parts inside the same compartment talk to each other.
If Firefox loaded the website at http://example.com/subfolder/, all the
HTML elements and script content residing on this exact address would
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Figure 7: An overview of the relationships between the different security
principals.
Figure taken from Mozilla’s website, about ”Script Security”[5]
be inside the same compartment. There are, however, different ways for
compartments to access parts of other compartments, where the main rules
are that higher privileged compartments have access to less privileged com-
partments, but not the opposite, unless the higher privileged compartment
explicitly chooses to share its access.
To be able to determine the security relation between different compart-
ments, a concept called security principals is used, which is something
every compartment have. Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between dif-
ferent principals, as there are several different principals, each with its own
rules. System principals pass all security checks, which is what the JavaScript
code from Gecko is running with. Content principals are associated with web
content, meaning that content from a specific origin could access parts from
content inside the same origin. An expanded principal is specified as an array
of origins, meaning that it contains several content principals. The expanded
principal itself gets access to its contents, but the content principals within
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does not get access to the expanded principal. Finally, there is the null prin-
cipal, which fails almost all security checks, meaning it has no privileges and
can only be accessed by itself and the JavaScript code from within Gecko.
3.2.3 Content Security Policy (CSP)
Content Security Policy (CSP), as described in Chapter 2.2.6, is a security
feature that is also implemented in Firefox. Since CSP is part of the script
security model, it also has a principal. This means that CSP is created
through a principal and access to it needs to be done through a principal. The
main class, the nsDocument class, is the place where the CSP is initialized,
by using a principal. As the nsDocument creates and holds a reference to
the CSP Principal, other classes can get access to the CSP through the
nsDocument class. Some noteworthy places that CSP is used inside Firefox
are the script loader class, ScriptLoader, and the EventListenerManager
class. These are locations which handle content related to script execution,
and therefore also the place where the proposed filter in this thesis should
be placed.
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4 Design and Implementation
This chapter will go through everything from the development process of the
implemented filter, including the requirements, design, tools used and the
actual implementation of the solution.
4.1 Design Choices
Software development includes a lot of choices that need to be made dur-
ing the development life cycle, regarding analyzing the problem, coming up
with a solution, making the design and figuring out how it should be im-
plemented. When creating a filter for Firefox defending against cross-site
scripting attacks, it is possible to choose many different approaches towards
the same main goal, but yet achieving differently in different categories such
as performance, availability, usability, maintenance and of course security.
In this section, some of the design choices made for this thesis work will be
explained in detail.
4.1.1 Requirements
For the filter implementation presented in this thesis, there is a couple of
preferred capabilities that should be achieved. These requirements are mostly
based upon the analysis of the papers from Related Work, Chapter 1.3.
Usability The filter should be easy to use, by not requiring any user-
interaction at all. The NoScript plug-in for Firefox, mentioned in Chapter
2.3.1, is an example of something that is not wanted, as NoScript do require
a fair amount of user interaction, as the plug-in have a lot of false-positives.
In a worst case scenario, a user might accidentally allow an attack to get
executed, even though the filter did stop the attack and warned about it,
as users might not understand what it means and the risk of ignoring the
warnings.
Low false-positives It is important that the filter do not interfere with
a user’s normal browsing sessions, unless it is to protect the user from an
actual attack. To achieve this, the filter should have a low number of false-
positives, which means that the filter should minimize the number of times
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where it think there is an attack when in reality it is not. The opposite of a
false-positive is a false-negative, which is when the filter thinks a script is safe
to load when in reality it is an attack and should be blocked. In practice it is
difficult to guarantee both non-existent false-positives and false-negatives in
a filter meant for defending against cross-site scripting attacks, as there are
so many different ways of using JavaScript in web applications, which again is
one of the reasons why cross-site scripting attacks are so prevalent. There is,
however, a balance to be made, to make sure that the filter do protect against
most attacks, which means it might introduce some false-positives, but at the
same time it cannot be too strict either. An example of a too strict filter is
again the NoScript plug-in for Firefox, which is really aggressive, introducing
a lot of false-positives which would interfere a lot during normal browsing
sessions, again requiring user interactions as a workaround.
High performance The filter should not incur a lot of performance over-
head, which would make the loading of web pages slower, which again would
interfere with the usage of normal web browsing. When using the filter, there
should be no noticeable delay when loading web pages in comparison with
the version of Firefox without the filter. This is an important requirement,
because of the competition between web browsers, as discussed in Chapter
2.4.
Provide protection against Reflected XSS The whole point of a fil-
ter protecting against cross-site scripting attacks is to provide this protection
properly. As there exists several different types of XSS, as discussed in Chap-
ter 2.2, it is important to clarify that the main focus of the filter is to protect
against the Reflected XSS type. This is the type of XSS that filters for the
other major web browsers also primarily focuses on, as it is very prevalent
and the easiest to discover, as described in Chapter 2.2.2. It is, however,
desirable to also protect against DOM Based XSS, which there will be some
basic protection against, as a byproduct of the Reflected XSS protection.
Complete DOM Based XSS support will, however, be lacking, as in the case
of XSS Auditor, as explained by Stock et al. [2].
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4.1.2 Browser Extension vs Internal Implementation
This thesis work is to add some functionality to the Firefox browser, which
there are several ways of accomplishing. Firefox do provide support for
browser extensions [40], which can extend and modify the capabilities of
the browser. These extensions are built using JavaScript, HTML and CSS
by using the WebExtensions API, a cross-platform system for developing ex-
tensions. They can provide a lot of functionality for altering the contents of
or extracting information from a web page, either with or without required
user interaction. There are, however, some reasons why browser extensions
are not suitable for this thesis work, explained in the following paragraphs.
Availability The main reason why browser extensions are less suitable is
because they are something that users themselves need to find, install and
use. It should not be necessary for users to know about what cross-site
scripting is and why it is important to protect against it, for them to take
advantage of this filter. By making this protection a choice for the user, the
filter would most likely not be used by the majority of users. This is why an
integration with Firefox itself would be a better solution, as then all users
would take advantage of the filter without the need of any knowledge about
it or action required.
Performance Even if there are users choosing to install and use such a
security filter, there is another drawback by making it as a browser extension,
which is a performance issue. When creating a browser extension for Firefox
you can only use the API’s supported by Firefox [41], utilizing JavaScript
code that talks to the internals of the browser itself. This means there are
more layers that the data needs to go through, from getting from the filter
to the internals of Firefox, which is needed for functionality of the extension
to work. If the filter, however, is placed inside the internals of Firefox, some
redundancy will be removed, which again will lead to a better performance,
which is what is chosen for this filter design.
Security The purpose of the proposed filter is to protect against Reflected
XSS attacks, which means the injected script is contained in both the request
and response. By implementing the filter as a part of the internal implemen-
32
Design and Implementation 33
tation of Firefox, it is easier to have a more robust integration being more
secure, as Firefox have a lot of coding principals including many security
features, as described in Chapter 3.2.
4.1.3 Blocking Technique
When detecting an XSS attack, the filter needs to take action to block the
injected script. There are mainly two ways of doing this, either blocking only
the injected script or blocking the whole web page from loading. By only
blocking the injected script you interfere less with the browsing experience
of the user, as they can still use the website as normal, without the parts
potentially affected by the injected script, which is what has been chosen for
this proposed filter.
4.1.4 Filtering Technique
As discussed in Chapter 2.3, there exists XSS filters based mainly on the
two filtering techniques regular expressions and string matching. For this
thesis work, the string matching technique and design from XSS Auditor was
chosen as the main basis. XSS Auditor used in the Google Chrome browser
does achieve high performance, few false-positives and low interference with
normal web browsing, providing protection against mainly Reflected XSS
attacks, as desired from the requirements in this thesis.
4.2 Design Overview
The main design of the filter is to compare every script returned in the
response with every potential dangerous script from the request. If there
is an occurrence of a script appearing in both the request and response,
the cross-site scripting filter will block this particular script from being ex-
ecuted. The filter itself is structured as its own class inside Firefox’s source
code, which makes it easy for other components in Firefox to use the filter
when needed. The filter is placed after the HTML parser, but before script
execution, providing benefits regarding both security and performance. The
following sections will describe the design of the filter in more detail.
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4.2.1 Placement
By basing the solution on the filtering principals of XSS Auditor, the place-
ment in Firefox will also be similar to how Auditor is placed inside of Google’s
Chrome browser. Auditor is placed between the HTML parser and JavaScript
execution environment, which provides several benefits, regarding high secu-
rity and performance, as explained in Chapter 2.3.2.
The filter needs to know what Firefox would intercept as script content to be
able to filter on the correct data. If the filter was placed before the HTML
parser, the filter would need to simulate the rules of the parser to try to ap-
proximate and identify what Firefox would intercept as script content. This
means that each loaded document would be parsed twice, once from the filter
and once from Firefox’s own parser, which would incur a lot of performance
overhead. Since Firefox need to parse the HTML documents regardless of the
filter’s presence, by placing the filter after the HTML parser, it can use the
results from Firefox’s own parsing when determining which content to filter
on, which again would not add any extra performance overhead regarding
the actual parsing process. Since the filter do not need to approximate the
parser rules when placed behind the HTML parser, the filter can also be sure
that it will discover, identify and act upon all the scripts entered through
Firefox, as the parser in Firefox will properly identify all script content before
they are processed further. As explained in Chapter 3, script content from
script tags and on-event handlers get sent to the classes ScriptLoader
and EventListenerManager, which will further examine the data and con-
duct the necessary security checks before they are sent to the JavaScript
engine for being executed, as shown in Figure 6. By extending on this figure,
extracting the relevant parts, Figure 8 shows the placement of the XSS filter,
residing in the same location as the CSP security feature.
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Figure 8: XSS Filter placement inside Firefox
4.2.2 Filter Class Structure
The filter class contains many methods for handling the different stages
needed in the filtering process. Since the filter can be invoked from dif-
ferent locations, the filter class contains several input points that all starts
the filtering process. This process contains a series of different tasks that
are performed in a particular order, before concluding whether there exists
a cross-site scripting injection or not. This includes methods for fetching the
input from the request to different methods for comparing this data with
either inline script, external script or on-event handlers, all of which need to
be processed differently.
4.3 Environment
This section will describe the system and tools used when developing the
Firefox filter. The operating system used is Arch Linux [42], a lightweight
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and flexible Linux distribution. For developing and writing the source code,
the free and open-source text editor Visual Studio Code (VS Code) [43] was
used.
4.3.1 Tools
Several different tools were utilized during the development of the proposed
filter.
Development Software When developing computer software, there exist
several Integrated Development Environment (IDE) and code editors with
a lot of added functionality for helping with software development. For the
development and writing of the source code for this thesis work, a lightweight,
free and open source text editor, VS Code [43], was used. VS Code provides
the necessary syntax highlighting and autocomplete, while also making it
easy to navigate around in the huge Firefox source code. Without adding
extra additions to VS Code, it does not handle building and debugging of the
Firefox code, which is one of the reasons it is a lightweight editor. For these
operations, however, there are more specialized tools that are better suited
for the development of Firefox, as Mozilla have their own recommendations
and tools available.
Mach As mentioned in Theoretical Background 2, the tool mach [36] is
a command-line interface used to start the building, debugging and testing
of Mozilla projects, which also was used in the development of this modified
version of Firefox. mach makes it possible to configure Firefox builds through
the usage of a mozconfig configuration file [44].
GNU Project Debugger (GDB) For debugging, GNU Project Debug-
ger (GDB) [45] was used, a tool that can start programs, make it stop on
specified conditions, examine what is happening at runtime and change things
in the program as it runs. GDB is a tool that can be invoked using the gdb
command, but when debugging Firefox it is possible to start GDB through
the usage of the mach command. After starting the debugging mode, GDB
makes it possible to create breakpoints in the code, which lets the debugger
inspect the state of the application as it is running.
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4.4 Implementation
This section will describe the implementation of the filter, how it is imple-
mented and integrated into Firefox, also containing details about every part
of the filtering process.
4.4.1 Data Flow
The data flow in Firefox is illustrated in Figure 6, found in Chapter 3.1. This
figure is then being expanded in Chapter 4.2.1, Figure 8, where it is shown
that the classes ScriptLoader and EventListenerManager perform several
security checks, including using the XSS filter. When the XSSFilter class
is being invoked from these classes, it first need to get all the input data
from the request. This data is retrieved through the nsDocument class. The
relevant input data fetched are all the GET- and POST-parameters contained
in the request. These parameters are saved in a list, which is then examined
further. Every parameter is checked if it contains any potential malicious
content, which in the case of a cross-site scripting attack would be any input
that contains some form of script content. This examination is explained
further below, in the next section. If the filter identifies any parameters as
potentially unsafe, it will compare them to every script entered into the filter
class, from the ScriptLoader and EventListenerManager classes. If any of
these scripts are also found in the request, the filter will mark the script as
unsafe, which will again notify these classes to not send the detected script
to the JavaScript engine for execution. All the other scripts will be executed
as normal.
4.4.2 Examining Input Data
After fetching all the GET- and POST-parameters from the request, these
needs to be analyzed for potential malicious content, which as mentioned
above, would consist of any type of script content. It is not a simple task to
identify whether or not these parameters contain any actual script content,
as there exists many different ways for creating and trying to hide the mali-
cious content of a parameter. A good source of many such attack payloads
is OWASP’s guidelines “XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet” [20], which con-
tains many examples of injections trying to circumvent typical XSS filtering
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techniques, including variations of using the script tag, on-event handlers,
as well as other, less used attack vectors. This is why the filter does not ac-
tually identify any script content in the parameters before marking them as
potentially unsafe, but rather make an assumption based on their contents.
If a parameter only contains alphanumeric characters, [a-z] [A-Z] [0-9],
or the underline character, , the parameter is considered safe, and should
not be processed further by the filter. These are very common characters
that can not be used to execute any scripts, making them safe to include in
the response. The reason why the underline character is included is that it is
often used in the case of a space in a parameter, which should be considered
safe. If there any other characters than the one specified, the filter would
include the parameter in further processing, which will be described in more
depth in the next section.
4.4.3 Looking for Injections - Matching Algorithm
If there are any potentially harmful content in the request parameters, for
every script received in the response, the filter is running a matching algo-
rithm which tries to identify whether any of these scripts are also contained
in any of the parameters. Depending on the type of script received from the
response, the filter handles the matching a bit differently. With inline scripts,
a comparison of the string representation of the actual script content is done
with each and everyone of the script content from all the inline scripts en-
tered through the ScriptLoader class. ScriptLoader also handles external
scripts, in which case it first gets the information about the external URL
where the actual script is located, before it executes the content inside the
script. For the filter, in the case of an external script, it does not do a com-
parison between the contents of the external script with the parameters, but
rather a comparison between the string representation of the external URL
and the parameters. As for other attack vectors, like the on-event handlers,
the same approach as the inline script matching is done. A similarity between
the inline and external script matching, however, is that before the actual
matching takes place, the content from the scripts and the parameters need
to be normalized. This means that these contents might differ slightly, as
the parameters content might have changed after going through the HTML
parser in Firefox, which again means that some of the same changes need to
38
Design and Implementation 39
be done by the filter for it to detect all injections properly. Several possible
factors that need to be addressed when normalizing the contents are listed
below, with basis in the rules from OWASP’s filter evasion cheat sheet [20].
Basic evasion techniques A basic normalization technique is to not dif-
ferentiate between upper- and lower-case characters. The script injection
<script src="http://xss.rocks/xss.js"></script>, which try to load
an external script through a different domain, and the slightly different
<script src="http://xss.ROCKS/xss.js"></script> would thus both be
treated as the same injection, as the uppercase characters in the second ex-
ample would be converted to lowercase. Another basic technique is to use
added whitespace or other characters that does not change the behavior
of the injected script, but that tries to hide the script from being recog-
nized by filters. An example attack could be the injection <script>alert
(1)</script>, where additional spaces is included, but where the injection
could successfully execute the script content, alert(1). This is related to us-
ing different encodings in the injections, which could include more advanced
attack payloads.
Different encodings It is common for attackers to use different encod-
ings in their attack payloads, by for example using URL encoding [46] for
the injected script, which again is a means of hiding the injected string. URL
encoding is something that needs to be used in URL’s when the URL contains
characters outside the American Standard Code for Information Interchange
(ASCII) character encoding set, which is why the URL has to be converted
into supported ASCII format. This is done by replacing unsafe ASCII char-
acters with a percent sign, %, followed by two hexadecimal characters. It is
also possible to use this encoding for any input for a website, which means
the filter needs to properly decode and identify the encoded data. In this fil-
ter’s implementation, it is supported by using Mozilla Firefox’s own internal
class for handling URL’s, which also handles decoding of URL encoded data.
Different attack vectors The attack vector for injecting XSS attacks
used in most examples in this thesis, utilize the script tag, <script>. It is,
however, possible to perform XSS injections by using many other different
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attack vectors, as explained in Chapter 2.2.5. The filter does currently sup-
port the script tag and every usage of the on-event handler, which may
be used in combination with many different attack vectors.
4.4.4 Handling of Discovered Script
If the filter does find a match between a script from the response with a
script from the request, it marks that particular script as unsafe and notify
the class that invoked the filter, telling the class that it should not execute
this particular script. Even if a script is detected and blocked, the filter
do continue to check all other script from the response with the request
parameters, as there might be more than one injected script. This is an
important aspect of the filter, as it only blocks the actual injected script and
not the whole page from loading. By choosing a different solution where the
filter is blocking the whole page when an attack is detected, the filter does
not need to do any further checking, as you can not execute any more scripts
as the page is not being loaded.
4.4.5 Firefox Integration
This section will briefly describe how the filter class is integrated and how it
connects to other parts of Firefox. The filter is implemented as its own
class inside Firefox’s source code, called XSSFilter, making it easy for
other components to use the filter when needed. The class is located in
the mozilla/dom/security folder, which is the same location as where all
the Content Security Policy (CSP) related classes resides. The filter is cur-
rently being created in places where the filtering functionality is needed, by
supplying it with the owning document class, nsDocument, in its constructor.
As discussed in Chapter 3, ScriptLoader is one of the primary classes that
uses the filter. Upon creation of the ScriptLoader class, it also creates a fil-
ter instance with the main document in its constructor. Every time the main
document are loading new data, like updated GET- and POST-parameters,
the XSSFilter instance located in ScriptLoader also gets updated, fetch-
ing the new request data, before using it in the filtering process every time
ScriptLoader encounters a script, either inline or external. Another inter-
nal class in Firefox, EventListenerManager, do also use the XSSFilter in
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a similar manner, but rather than inline and external scripts it takes care of
scripts from on-event handlers.
The XSSFilter class itself is also accessing other components inside Firefox.
To retrieve the GET parameters it has to access the URL from the main doc-
ument class before using the URLParams class for parsing it correctly, making
sure the content is properly URL-decoded. As for the POST parameters, the
filter gets access to the nsIHttpChannel class through the main document,
which contains the necessary data for retrieving the parameters, by utilizing
different helper classes in Firefox. It also uses several helper classes for a lot
of string manipulation, operations like searching for whole strings or single
characters, or converting between different types of strings and encodings.
4.4.6 Challenges
There have been some challenges with the implementation of the filter. Since
the filter is being implemented inside an already built software, the Mozilla
Firefox web browser, the filter needs to be integrated in a way so that it can
cooperate with existing code, data flow and different ways of doing things.
Mozilla Firefox is a very huge piece of software, containing many different
classes spread across separated modules that talk to each other by using dif-
ferent means. To properly understand this whole structure and following the
data flow proved to be a challenging task, as there were used a lot of differ-
ent coding principles and internal code for different tasks. String-handling is
a good example of how complex the code is, as there exists many different
types of strings and as many ways of converting between them and utilizing
them correctly.
4.4.7 Unit Testing
Unit testing is a good way of assuring that separate parts of the code is work-
ing as desired. In the case of the filter implementation, the parts containing
the examination of input data and the matching algorithms are the most im-
portant to test, as these are the parts dealing with the actual filtering process.
Several unit tests have been implemented to verify this process, by supplying
some sample injected data. As the filter require some special characters to
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be included in the parameter for it to be checked for in the matching process,
several tests have been implemented confirming these character checks. The
matching algorithm also have several tests with different injection inputs,
verifying that the string matching works correctly. As for testing other parts
of the filter, which relies on many different parts of other functions in Firefox,
a more complete testing is done in Chapter 5.
42
Analysis and Assessment 43
5 Analysis and Assessment
The filter needs to be evaluated, as explained in Chapter 2.4, in terms of
several different categories. The filter should be tested for how well it protects
against XSS attacks and how much it affects the performance of Firefox .
An analysis of the filter’s implementation, some of the design choices and
different limitations are also an important part of the evaluation, as it will
highlight what is good and what needs to be improved.
5.1 Protection Effectiveness
Protection effectiveness is about how well the filter is able to protect against
XSS attacks, in particular Reflected XSS attacks.
5.1.1 Methodology of Testing
To be able to measure the effectiveness of the filter, it is necessary to con-
duct testing by doing an examination of a known vulnerable website, as it
is not the website’s own security features that need to be tested, but the
filter’s capabilities. One way of making sure this is the case is to implement
a sample website, used for the sole purpose of testing the filter. The created
website should try to mimic some of the functionality found on other typical
websites, as this would provide a better generalization of the filter’s overall
effectiveness. A common functionality found on a majority of websites is the
search field, which is also susceptible to Reflected XSS attacks. The website
should therefore consist of a search field, which would send the query to a web
server, where the response should be a page containing the input query from
the search field. Since the website has no built in security features, inputting
a script into this search field would effectively execute it upon receiving the
response. By visiting this vulnerable website through the modified version
of Firefox, containing the XSS filter, the filter should be able to both detect
and stop the injected script from being executed. This is being tested by
conducting an automated test consisting of several different script injections,
to see if the filter detects all of the attacks, or just a subset of them. The
automated test is made possible by the usage of Selenium WebDriver [47],
which makes it possible to do direct calls to a specific web browser instance,
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by using its native support for automation. A simple script will be created
that uses Selenium, which takes a list of injections as input, which then will
test each of them against the sample vulnerable website. The outcome of
this script will be a list of both the successfully injected scripts and the ones
that did not get injected.
The script injections that are to be tested, are collected from a variety of
sources. An extensive list found on the website gbhackers.com [48], and
three different collections gathered from github.com [49] [50] [51]. In total, a
list containing 920 unique script injections where created from these sources.
This list consist of many different attack vectors targeted at very specific
functionality of common websites. Since the sample vulnerable website cre-
ated is a very simple website, not containing a complex usage of different
HTML tags, it is assumed that most of the injections would not be success-
fully injected. This is why several hundred injections was collected, to make
sure that a big enough subset would actually be successfully injected, which
could be used in the analysis. For achieving accurate results, the automa-
tion testing script would actually need to be executed twice. This process is
shown in Figure 9. First, all the injections had to be tested against the vul-
nerable website without the filter enabled. This way, all the injections that
are actually working on the vulnerable site, would be recorded in a list cre-
ated by the testing script. Next, the list of injected scripts would be used to
run the testing script another time, this time using a version of Firefox that
has the filter enabled. The script would once again create a list containing
both the successful injections and the injections stopped by the filter, which
then would be used for further analysis. This is done to make sure that the
analyzed results are containing actually injectable script content, so that it is
known that it is the filter that stop the injections, and not something wrong
with the injections themselves.
5.1.2 Results
When running the automated test as described above, the website without
the filter was successfully injected with a total of 138 different script injec-
tions. Although many of the injections used similar attack vectors, there
were still a good mixture of different attack vectors and encodings used, typ-
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Figure 9: Testing of the implemented filter
ically trying to circumvent filtering mechanisms. When using these injections
in the version of Firefox containing the XSS filter, only 29 were successfully
injected. The filter did, therefore, block 109 of 138 injections. By examin-
ing the results further, it is possible to pinpoint the weaknesses of the filter,
which again could be used to improve it.
Blocked scripts Most of the script injections were both detected and
blocked by the filter. This included the usage of many different variations of
the script tag, were the injections were adding other unnecessary charac-
ters or using URL encoding trying to circumvent the filter. Because of the
filter’s location, behind the HTML parser, and the fact that all parameters
gets URL-decoded, all of these injections were blocked. There were also a lot
of usage of on-event handlers, utilizing similar circumvention techniques.
Most of the on-event handlers were also blocked, used in combination with
different attack vectors like the img tag, svg tag and body tag, since all
of these on-event handlers had to go through the EventListenerManager
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class, were the filter was invoked from.
Injected scripts As there were a total of 29 successful injections, it is in-
teresting to analyze why the filter did not detect them. Table 2 contains an
overview of the injections, which will be further analyzed here. 16 of 29 of the
successful injections used the HTML tag iframe, in different forms, utilizing
upper/lower capitals, URL encoding and otherwise including different char-
acters to confuse the filter. The iframe tag allows web pages to load other
web pages inside itself, where the tag also support the usage of on-event
handlers. Even though 16 of 138 of the iframe-injections got successfully
executed, the filter did actually block the instances utilizing on-event han-
dlers, as this is well supported by the filter. The filter does not, however,
detect iframe’s using the src attribute, as it is not being invoked in the
parts of Firefox that handles the script content inside these tags. 7 other
injections were also cases were the attack vectors are not supported, which
used the embed tag, svg tag and the object tag. The last 6 cases, however,
used either the script tag or on-event handlers, but did not get detected.
This is because they used varies encodings, like HTML entity encoding and
base64 encoding, which are not supported by the filter. This is a good exam-
ple showing that only dealing with the most common URL encoding is not
enough, as there exists several other encodings that might be interpreted as
script content by the website, that also needs to be considered.
5.1.3 Limitations
There are several limitations regarding the capabilities of the filter, which
could be categorized into several categories. Some limitations were related
to the actual filtering rules, which means the capability of the filter to detect
different types of script injections, using different methods for trying to cir-
cumvent the filter. The other types of limitations is related to the different
input and output sources supported by the filter, as there are more ways
than using script tags and on-event handlers to inject script content into
websites.
Limitations regarding filtering rules As described in Chapter 4.4.3, the
filter did support URL encoded data, which turned out to work really well,
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Attack vector Number Not supported Difficulty to fix 
iframe 16 attack vector easy 
embed 3 attack vector easy 
object 3 attack vector easy 
svg 1 attack vector easy 
script 2 encoding moderate 
on-event 4 encoding moderate 
Table 2: Testing of the implemented filter
stopping several injections. It did not, however, support HTML entity and
base64 encoding, which led to script injections being executed in the browser.
Support for more different encodings should therefor be implemented.
As seen from the results, every injection utilizing the iframe tag were success-
fully injected and executed in the browser, as this was one amongst several
injections in which the injected attack vector was not accounted for by the
filter. This is a general limitation that the filter simply supports too few
attack vectors utilizing different HTML tags. Although the filter supports
on-event handlers, which is used by a vast amount of HTML tags, these
on-event handlers are not always necessary to trigger a script for execution,
which is why this support needs to be improved.
In Chapter 2.3.2, some limitations of the XSS Auditor filter were discussed,
which are tightly related to the limitations of this filter implementation, as
they are based on the same string matching design. Not all of the limitations
from Auditor applies though, as this filter does not require the same strict
subset of special characters to be present, as Auditor requires. However, the
limitations regarding partial string injections is something that has not been
addressed in this filter either. If a website have several input fields were its
content gets concatenated without proper validation, an attacker might take
advantage of this to create a complete injection by splitting the injection into
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two or more fields. It is worth mentioning that this is a rather special case,
as the website need to have some very specific functionality for this attack to
work, but it is still a possibility that should be considered to be addressed.
Limitations regarding request input sources Another type of limita-
tion is regarding every input source from the request, which means every
source of user modified fields that might enter into a web application. The
absolutely most used input sources are the GET- and POST parameters,
which are currently the only sources supported by the filter. There are, how-
ever, other possible input sources where users could inject malicious content,
like for example HTTP headers and cookies. Although these are more spe-
cial cases, were the web applications need some more specific use-cases, they
might still occur, which is why they should be considered to be supported.
5.2 Performance
The performance of the implemented filter is an important factor for its
usefulness. For measuring the performance, Mozilla’s own methodology for
comparing page load times across browsers [52] was used. This methodology
consists of choosing a set of websites that are loaded in Firefox, repeated
several times, while measuring the loading time for each page load. This
is a process that is automated with the help of Selenium WebDriver [47],
which makes it possible to make direct calls to specified browsers using their
native support for automation. For this implemented filter, it would be
interesting to compare the performance of the modified Firefox instance with
the original Firefox instance, which does not include a built-in XSS filter. By
using the Selenium WebDriver it is possible to supply both of these instances
as options, which means that the testing would be fully automated. As
mentioned, it is necessary to have a set of websites to be used for testing. In
the case for Firefox’s own testing, they chose to pick the 200 most popular
websites from the Alexa page rank site [11], because news sites typically
contain a lot of trackers.
48
Analysis and Assessment 49
5.2.1 Methodology of Testing
For the testing of this filter, news site are also well suited, as they contain a
lot of script content and most often also contains a search field for looking
up articles, which is something that is useful for invoking the filter mech-
anism. For the testing, only a subset of the most popular news sites from
the Alexa page rank site where chosen, as not every news site had a working
search field. A total of 20 news sites where selected for the testing. It is
assumed that most of the top news sites can be considered to be relatively
safe, not containing any easy to exploit cross-site scripting vulnerabilities.
This does not, however, hinder the filtering mechanism to activate, since the
filter would still search the request parameters for potential dangerous con-
tents, and do the comparison between them and the scripts contained in the
response. This is done regardless of the existence of any actual vulnerabil-
ities or not, since that is the whole point of the filter, to act as an added
layer in the defense in depth strategy trying to stop attacks from potential
vulnerabilities.
To make sure the modified browser actually runs the code for the imple-
mented filter, each website was given some input data by using their search
fields. The testing was done with two different input data, with the first one
simulating a totally legit request that does not contain any script content
at all, inputting the query article, and the second one containing a simple
script, <script>alert(1)</script>, simulating a very simple XSS attack.
In the first case, by inputting a safe query, the filter would inspect this query
and not find any potentially dangerous characters, which means the filter
would not need to do any additional processing. In the second case, the
same inspection of the query would be done, which would mark the injection
as unsafe. After marking it as unsafe, every time a filer would get a script
from the response, this script would be matched against the unsafe parame-
ter, trying to identify if the parameter is contained in any of the scripts. The
performance difference between the original and modified browser should be
expected to be lower from the first case than the second case, as the filter
is doing more work the second query. One thing to notice here is that the
filter would most likely not detect an actual attack, as previously assumed
that popular news websites are probably protected against simple injection
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attacks.
5.2.2 Results
After running the automated test, the result does not suggest any added
performance overhead by including the filter. The measured load times were
actually so similar that an accurate estimate of how much the filter affected
the performance is not possible to measure. Table 3 illustrates the results,
where the unit of the load times are milliseconds. The columns marked
”Invalid” means that a web page did not load correctly, which means it got
removed when calculating the average load time. In the case of loading web
pages with the query article, the version containing the filter did actually
perform approximately 3.2% faster on average, than Firefox without the
filter. In the case of using the query <script>alert(1)</script>, the
original Firefox version performed approximately 1.7% faster on average.
It is worth noting that the results did not contain any huge fluctuations
when performing the test, and the biggest difference after calculating the
average for each test run was about 362 ms, which was the difference between
Run 1a of the original version and Run 2s of the original version. The
difference between the different runs of the modified filter were really small,
as seen in the figure. As the total difference between the original and modified
versions are also relatively small, the conclusion is that the filter did not
add any measurable performance overhead, meaning it achieves very high
performance. There are, however, several factors that might have affected
the testing, as described in the next section, 5.2.3. Although, since there
were so few fluctuations between the calculated averages, it is assumed that
the results reflect the reality fairly well.
5.2.3 Limitations
There are several factors that might have affected the performance testing,
which could mean the result are misleading. When Mozilla did their own
performance testing, they used a total of 200 different websites, a number
much higher that what was used when testing this filter. Choosing a larger
subset of websites for the testing could have given some results reflecting a
more average loading time, but the 20 selected websites did achieve a very
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Table 3: Loading times results, measured in milliseconds
small variance in the calculated average, so it should not be of much difference
if choosing to include any more than this. Some other factors that might have
had more impact on the results are fluctuations in the local Internet speed
of the testing machine and the fluctuations in the web traffic received by the
tested websites at the time of the testing. It is typical that these factors
varies throughout the day, depending on the time. The test of the original
and modified browser were done consecutively, where each test, where one
test contains loading of 1000 websites, took approximately 80 minutes to
perform. This is not a very huge time span, meaning these fluctuations
should not be considered to be of any huge significance. Another factor
that is less likely to have affected the performance is the processing power of
the testing machine itself, meaning the CPU of the machine might have been
running different tasks when conducting the testing of the different browsers.
The testing machine was, however, left alone during the actual testing period,
which should result in minimal affection from other tasks running.
These are all limitations that somehow might have affected the testing results,
some easier than others to control and minify, which was done to the best
of ability. Each of them should not be of any significance, and the results
are considered to be very accurate, but it is still worth mentioning these
limitations, as is is often small variances in the results which should be tried
to be explained.
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5.3 Implementation
It is also interesting to analyze how well the filter itself is implemented, in
terms of how well it is integrated into Firefox, and how it affects the usage
of Firefox other than the already measured performance.
5.3.1 Conform to Mozilla Firefox’s Internal Coding Standards
Mozilla Firefox have strict guidelines for how things should be integrated
into the browser, a coding standard for everything from simple formatting
to the usage of different parts from the code. The implemented filter has
tried to comply to these rules, by following the general coding standards,
particularly regarding handling of strings [53], as string matching have been a
major part of the filter mechanism. Getting access to other parts of the code,
parsing data correctly, exception handling and testing is other examples good
implementation regarding Mozilla’s coding principles. There is, however, one
aspect of the implementation that is not being integrated well enough for
being part of a release version of Firefox. This is the fact that the filter is
not utilizing the concept of script security and the usage of principals, as
explained in Chapter 3.2.
5.3.2 Blocking Technique
When detecting a potential XSS attack, the filter should be able to act upon it
and block the script injection. There are several ways of doing this blocking,
as mentioned in Chapter 4.1.3, it is possible to only block the injected script,
or the whole web page. Both of these techniques have their advantages and
disadvantages, which are being discussed here.
Partial blocking One of the reasons for blocking only the injected script
is that it would interfere less with a user’s normal browsing of web pages,
as the user could still use the other parts of the web page, which are not
affected by the injected script. This is also a huge advantage in the case of
a false-positive, again as the user gets less interrupted, as only a subpart of
the page gets blocked.
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Blocking whole page There are, however, some disadvantages when choos-
ing to only block parts of the page. When the filter detects an attack, it is
not unexpected that an attacker might have combined several techniques and
parts when injecting the script into the website, hoping that one of the in-
cluded parts of the script would be able to circumvent the filter. Hopefully,
the filter would be advanced enough to properly detect and block all the
parts of the injection, but it might be some special conditions that the filter
does not account for, leading to a successful attack. This is one of the rea-
sons why it might be a better approach, when only concerned with security,
to block the whole web page from loading when an attack is detected, as
the detected attack might just be part of a bigger attack. Another possibil-
ity for an attacker is to trick the filter to not block an injected script, but
to block some important security feature that are actually needed by the at-
tacked website itself. An example is a website that requires the JavaScript file
security.js for its security features to work, which which will be included
in the response when requesting the website. Since the filter compares script
content from the request with script from the response, an attacker might
inject a script containing the same filename, security.js, which would then
be detected by the filter as an attack, as the file is both in the request and
the response of the website. This would then disable the websites security
features, which means the attacker could create an injection that combines
the file security.js with some other malicious script executing an attack.
Since the filter actually detected an attack, it would be better to block the
entire web page from loading, as this would prevent this issue altogether.
5.3.3 Usability
The implemented filter does not currently support any interaction from or
with the user of Firefox, which is something that should be considered, as
more control of and information about the filter’s behavior could be beneficial
to websites and Firefox’s users.
Choosing blocking technique As there are clearly advantages and dis-
advantages with both the blocking techniques, it is possible to make this
a decision for websites to take, by utilizing the X-XSS-Protection HTTP
response header [54]. This is a header currently supported by most of the ma-
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jor web browsers, Chrome, Safari, Internet Explorer and Edge, and makes it
possible to decide how the browser should act when they detect XSS attacks.
There are four possible values for the X-XSS-Protection header. Setting it
to 0 will disable the filter and 1 will enable it and only remove the dangerous
parts. By using 1; mode=block, the filter will be enabled and the whole web
page will be blocked. A last option is using 1; report=<reporting-uri>,
which will only remove the dangerous parts and use a feature from CSP
where the violation is reported and sent to the specified URL.
Violation feedback Another functionality missing from the implementa-
tion, something the implemented CSP feature already has, is the ability to
properly notify users of a violation. In the case of a XSS violation, this would
be when the filter detects and/or blocks the attack, depending on what the
previous mentioned X-XSS-Protection header is set to. This header, did as
mentioned above, support a reporting feature, where a details of the violation
would get sent to a specified URL. However, a violation notice should also
be indicated to the users of Firefox, regardless of the reporting feature of the
X-XSS-Protection header. In the filter’s current state, these violation details
are only shown in a special console meant for the developers of Firefox itself,
and not in the developer console accessible to normal users of Firefox. The
details shown to the users does not have to contain every detail about the




Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities continues to be one of the most
critical web security threats among todays web applications, despite of the
large quantity of research, proposals and solutions being published and im-
plemented [10]. This is a type of vulnerability that mainly and directly
compromise the end-users of web applications, which means they need addi-
tional protection. All of the major web browsers have taken action by imple-
menting several protection mechanisms defending against these XSS attacks.
Since XSS is such a complex vulnerability, there is not a single protection
mechanism that will stop all of the attacks, but rather a strategy of having
several mechanisms that together provide the best protection, utilizing the
defense-in-depth strategy. All of the major web browsers have included a
built-in filter for XSS protection as one of these counter measures, except
the second most used, Mozilla Firefox, which have neglected to include such
feature. As seen from the lacking of effectiveness of the most comprehensive
protection mechanism in Firefox, CSP, as discussed Chapter 2.2.6, the need
for a built-in XSS filter in Firefox is evident, considering the prevalence and
consequence of these attacks.
This thesis has made a proposal and implementation for such a filter, which
is built-in and integrated into Firefox. The filtering principles for the fil-
ter was based on the filter used in Google’s Chrome browser, XSS Auditor,
which utilizes an advantageous placement inside the web browser, achiev-
ing both good protection and high performance. After doing several tests
of the implemented filter, findings suggest that the filter did perform very
well in protecting against a wide variety of script injections, which contained
different attack vectors utilizing several methods trying to circumvent the
filtering mechanism. Adding and removing characters, using URL encodings
and different on-event handlers were efficiently blocked by the filter. There
were, however, some limitations regarding different types of encodings and
a lack of support for some attack vectors, which are something that needs
to be added before the filter could be considered sufficient for every-day us-
age. Performance-wise, the filter did not show any measurable difference
compared to the version of Firefox without the filter. By not having any
huge performance overhead means that adding small additions for fixing the
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limitations mentioned should not incur significantly more overhead, as the
most demanding filtering mechanisms are already implemented.
The modified version of Firefox containing the filter do, therefore, already
provide much better protection than the original version of Firefox. Even
though there are limitations that needs to be addressed for it to be a con-
sidered a fully fledged solution, it already serves as an important layer in
the defense-in-depth strategy, providing a little extra to the much desired




As discussed in Chapter 5, the implemented filter still has room for improve-
ments considering its protection effectiveness. The areas for improvements
are regarding input sources, attack vectors, support for more encodings and
integration with existing Firefox code. Most of these improvements should
be rather trivial to implement. Firefox’s internal code has easy access to
other input sources data, like the most relevant, which are HTTP headers.
In the case of attack vector support, the already supported attack vectors
only needed about two lines of code for them to be covered, so it should
be as trivial to add support to other vectors, like the iframe, embed, svg
and object tags, as mentioned in Chapter 5.1.2. The only challenge with
these is to identify the location inside the Firefox code where they are being
processed, as they might be handled in vastly different areas in the code.
Support for more encodings should also not be too difficult to achieve, as
there exist good documentation covering how different encodings work, and
the fact that the filter class is structured in such a way that it is easy to add
more advanced filtering rules. The most challenging task would be to bet-
ter integrate the filter into the existing Firefox code, to comply with all the
security principals and coding standards that are required by Mozilla. An-
other improvement could be to implement support for the X-XSS-Protection
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